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Abstract 
 
The study presented main features of possible currency options which can be potentially 
adopted by Zimbabwe in the aftermath of multi-currency regime. The currency options 
analyzed are dollarization, joining the CMA and re-introduction of the Zimbabwe dollar 
(Z$). The proposed management systems to underpin the reintroduction of the 
Zimbabwean dollar are currency board, free banking and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
(RBZ). For each of the options analyzed, the practicality of Zimbabwe in adopting and/or 
implementing such currency was also explained. Although any of the three options could 
be adopted and implemented, the study considered the options in the following 
descending order of priority: (i) dollarization, (ii) retaining the Z$ but under the 
management system of a currency board, (iii) Joining the CMA, (iv) retaining the Z$ 
under the management of RBZ, with the institution having new management, and lastly 
(v) free banking.   
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Zimbabwe’s severe and chaotic hyperinflation trend in the new millennium and 
especially from the year 2000 to end of January 2009 led the country to voluntarily 
abandon one of its sovereign symbols, its monetary currency, the Zimbabwean dollar 
(Z$) by adopting the use of other foreign currencies as means of payments, unit of 
account, store of value and standard of deferred payments. Latest hyperinflation rate 
figures released by Zimbabwe’s Central Statistical Office (CSO)1 was that of July 2008 
in which the country’s month-on-month rate was estimated at 231.2 million percent, 
while the International Monetary Fund (IMF)2 estimates the hyperinflation rate to be 489 
billion as of September 2008. On the other hand, independent analysts, for instance, 
Steve Hanke (2008)3 put this inflation rate at 6.5 quindecillion novemdecillion percent 
(that is 65 followed by 107 zeros) as of December 2008. In comparison with other 
countries, the second highest inflation rated country in September 2008 was Burma, 
whose inflation rate was around 39 percent4. Relative and in comparison to other African 
countries in general, and Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries 
in particular, where the average annual inflation since 2000 has been below 20 percent, 
Zimbabwe’s inflation rate was by far an extreme outlier.  
 
The country has been ravaged by hyperinflation for a considerable period to such an 
extent that the value of the local currency, the Zimbabwean dollar (Z$), has been 
estimated to have lost more than 99.99 percent of its value within a space of less than two 
years alone, between 2007 and 2008 (Hanke, 2008). On the local scene, the Zimbabwean 
dollar (Z$) has been playing second fiddle to other currencies such as US dollar (US$), 
the South African rand (ZAR), the Euro and British pound, to mention just a few credible 
currencies that were widely used in almost all transactions. The use of these currencies 
gained ascendancy as far back as 2006, although their wide scale use started beginning of 
2008 across the board with even rural people selling their livestock in US$ and ZAR.  
 
A combination of hyperinflation and central bank's monopoly over the production of 
currency over the past two or so years has forced the Zimbabwean citizens to use the 
government issued currency under duress with no recourse for the populace over their 
dissatisfaction with the currency's value. During hyperinflation period (2000 – 2009 
(January), Zimbabweans felt the bitter brute as they have had to cope with recurrent 
currency transitions from denomination notes of Z$5, Z$10 and Z$20 maxims (at 
independence in 1980) to a currency whose denominations has rapidly shifted from 
thousands, to millions, to billions, to trillions, to quadrillion, to hextillion, and ended at 
                                                 
1 CSO if the collector and custodian of the country’s formal statistics on socio-economic issues 
2 International monetary Fund (IMF) (2009). Preliminary Conclusions of the IMF Article IV Consultation 
Mission (Facsimile addressed to Zimbabwe’s Minister of Finance, 23 March 2009) 
3 Steve H. Hanke is a Professor of Applied Economics the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. He has 
written extensively in monetary issues including dollarization and currency boards in general and has also 
written a number of briefs and papers in particular on Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation scenario 
4 Hanke Steve (2008). Zimbabwe: From hyperinflation to Growth. Cato Institute (Centre for Global Liberty 
and Prosperity Development Policy Analysis). 
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octillion5 by end of January 20096. The presence of both semi and informal dollarization 
have forced the government to allow use of multiple currencies such as the South African 
rand, British pound, Botswana pula and the euro7 and this policy was pronounced during 
the presentation of the country's 2009 national budget on 30 January 20098. At first, the 
government insisted that the Z$ should remain the legal tender alongside other 
currencies. However, due to worthless and total loss of confidence in the Z$ by the 
majority, the government latter suspended the Z$ from the market, initial for twelve 
months and then latter for another three years.   
 
Although the country will continue to use the multi-currency regime until end of 2012, 
questions still remain as to what will be the best option currency to adopt after this 
regime. This study therefore intends to provide a critique of some of the possible 
currency options that the country may consider adopting.  
 
1.1 Zimbabwe’s hyperinflationary trend 
 
Hyperinflation is considered as inflation out of control, a condition in which prices 
increase rapidly as local currency loss its value. Cagan (1956:25) defines “hyperinflation 
as beginning in the month the rise in price exceeds 50 percent and as ending in the month 
before the monthly rise in prices drops below that amount and stays below for at least a 
year”. 
 
The history of hyperinflation in Zimbabwe can be said to date back to early 1999. 
Although data from CSO shows that the country’s monthly inflation rate reached the 50 
per cent mark in February 1999, this monthly rate was above 100 per cent by November 
2001 before jumping to rates higher than 200 per cent by January 2003. By the December 
2003, the rate was squarely at 600 per cent, though it temporarily declined through 2004 
and 2005, reaching the trough of 124 per cent in March 2005. Since April 2006, the 
monthly rate has been above 1000 percent, with the upward trend reaching 2200.2 per 
cent in March 2007. This inflation rate was estimated at 231.2 million percent by end of 
July 2008 (CSO) with IMF’s (2009) estimates putting the hyperinflation rate to be 489 
billion percent as of September 2008. This hyperinflation trend and other economic 
indicators are depicted in Table 1. 
 
                                                 
5 Zimbabwe’s highest money denomination in January 2009 was Z$100 trillion. Adding back the 13 zeros 
Zimbabwe's central bank has lopped off since August 2006 (3 zeros were chopped off on August 1st 2006 
and further 10 zeros were chopped off on August 1st 2008) as a means of trying to make the country's 
currency somewhat more manageable, totally zeros will be 27. Thus in actual fact, the country’s highest 
domination was 1 octillion by end of January 2010.   
6 One million has six zeros, one trillion has 12 zeros, one hextillion has 21 zeros; one octillion has 27 zeros, 
one nonillion has 30 zeros while one decillion has 33 zeros. 
7 It is important to note that the country’s use of multiple currencies is not legal or formal dollarization 
from the government of Zimbabwe’s point of view as pointed by RBZ governor. The Herald Newspaper 
(18 August 2009), “Reintroduce Zim dollar: [RBZ governor]”. Available at:  
http://www1.herald.co.zw/inside.aspx?sectid=8782&cat=1 
8 Available at: http://www.kubatana.net/docs/econ/min_fin_budget_2009_090129.pdf. 
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   Table 1: Zimbabwe’s economic performance 
Year GDP GDP per capita Annual Inflation 
 US$ billions  % Growth US$                %  
1980-1998 7.0 3.9 740.4 20.5 
1999 6.0 -3.6 508 56.9 
2000 5.7 -7.3 489 55.2 
2001 5.7 -2.7 490 112.1 
2002 5.6 -4.4 478 198.9 
2003 5.1 -10.4 433 598.7 
2004 5.0 -3.6 430 132.7 
2005 5.0 -4.0 427 585.8 
2006 4.9 -5.4 417 1,281.1 
2007 4.7 -6.1 403 108,844.1 
2008 3.2 -14.1 265a 489,000,000,000b 
   Sources: IMF online database  
‘a’: Government of Zimbabwe’s(16 July 2009). Mid Year Fiscal Policy Statement 
  ‘b’: IMF (2009) 
 
Factors which have been among the major causes of hyperinflation in Zimbabwe includes 
money printing (seigniorage), foreign currency shortages (with its resultant black market 
premium), demand pull-inflation (due to disrupted production activities, especially in the 
agricultural sector), and imported/cost-push inflation (Makochekanwa, 2007). 
 
With respect to money printing, the Zimbabwean government has been good at using the 
money machine print. For instance, the unbudgeted government expenditure of 1997 (to 
pay the war veterans gratuities); the publicly condemned and unjustifiable Zimbabwe’s 
intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) war in 1998; the expenses of 
the controversial land reform (which started in 2000), the parliamentary (2000/2005) and 
presidential (2002) elections, introduction of senators in 2005 (at least 66 posts) as part of 
‘widening the think tank base’ and the international payments obligations, especially 
since 2004, all resulted in massive money printing by the government. Above these 
highlighted and topical expenditure issues, the printing machines has also been the 
government’s solution for such expenses as civil servants’ salaries. This printing has thus 
contributed towards the loss in value of the local currency, the Z$. 
 
1.2 Multi – currency regime 
 
In an attempt to restore credibility in the monetary system and also to arrest the 
hyperinflationary trend, the government of Zimbabwe introduced the use of multi-
currency on 30th January 2009. Following introduction of this regime, month-on-month 
inflation trend sharply declined from the rates of above 49 billion percent to less than 1% 
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since February 2009 until today, with even negative inflations rates9 experienced in some 
monthly rates. The government further suspended the use of the local Z$ on 13th April 
200910  initially for a year, and further another three years (starting from January 2010). 
According to the country’s three year macroeconomic framework announced on 23rd 
December 2009, “Government will, therefore, maintain the principle of use of multiple 
currencies over the Framework period 2010 – 2012”11. Thus, the use of multiple 
currencies and the suspension of the Zimbabwean dollar from the monetary system will 
continue given that they have resulted in the immediate stop of hyperinflation. Although 
the country has adopted the use of multi-currencies, it is important to note that the regime 
do not constitute formal dollarization12.  
 
1.3 Study justification  
 
Following introduction of multi-currency use, hyperinflation in Zimbabwe is now history. 
Monthly inflation rates since February 2009 to date have been either negative or when 
positive, they have been below 1%. However, one major challenge remains in the 
country’s future monetary chapter and this problem involves choice of a single currency 
that the country should use once the multi-currency dispensation is over. The single 
currency to be chosen should not only ensure that the country do not return to the chaotic 
hyperinflation trend, but that its credibility in fulfilling the function of money such as 
medium of exchange, unit of account, store of value and standard of deferred payments 
should be credible in the eyes of the majority Zimbabweans and economic agents.  
 
1.4 Study objective  
 
The main objective of this study is to critically analyze the various possible currency 
options that Zimbabwe can consider adopting in the after math of the multi-currency 
regime. This investigation is paramount because of two reasons. Firstly, the use of multi-
currency is temporary, and secondly, the country needs a permanent single currency in its 
monetary system.    
 
                                                 
9 For instance, Zimbabwe’s month-on-month inflation rates for 2009 were -2.3% (January), -3.1% 
(February), -3% (March), -1.1% (April), -1% (May), 0.6% (June), 1% (July), 0.4% (August) and 0.5% 
(September). (Government of Zimbabwe, 23 December 2009) 
 
10 The Zimbabwean newspaper (14 April 2009), “Zimbabwe suspends own currency for  12 months”, 
Available at:  
www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=20402&Itemid=103. 
11 Government of Zimbabwe (23 December 2009), “Three Year Macro-Economic Policy & Budget 
Framework”. Available at: http://www.zimtreasury.org/downloads-sub.cfm?SubID=15.  
12 According to RBZ authorities, the country had not formally dollarised or randified, because that would 
involve a number of legal and economic issues. (The Zimbabwe Herald (18 August 2009), “Re-intriduce 
the Zim dollar: RBZ official”). Available at:  
http://www1.herald.co.zw/inside.aspx?sectid=8782&cat=1 
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2 FUNCTIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF A GOOD CURRENCY   
 
Before going into detailed analysis of the possible currency options, it is paramount to 
reflect on the various functions and characteristics of a good currency. This will help to 
evaluate the possible best currency option. 
 
2.1 Functions of money 
 
Money is generally considered as having four main functions, namely medium of 
exchange, unit of account, store of value, and standard of deferred payments.  
 
In the medium of exchange function, money is used to intermediate exchange of goods 
and services, thereby facilitating transactions between buyers and sellers. In this function, 
money avoids the inefficiencies such as the “double coincidence of wants” problem 
which is normally associated with barter trading system.  
 
A unit of account is an acceptable standard numerical unit of measurement of the market 
value of goods, services and other transactions. This function is a necessary requirement 
for formulation of commercial agreements which involve debt. To function as a ‘unit of 
account’, whatever is being used as money must be: 
 
§ Divisible into smaller units without loss of value; 
§ Fungible – that is one unit or piece must be perceived as equivalent to any other; 
and 
§ Have a specific weight, or measure or size which can be verifiably countable. For 
instance, coins are often made with ridges around the edges, so that any removal 
of material from the coin (lowering its commodity value) will be easy to detect.  
 
 
The store of value function requires the commodity designated as money to be reliably 
saved, stored, and retrieved and be predictably useful when it is so retrieved.  
 
Money functions as a standard of deferred payment when it is accepted in settling debts 
which might have been accumulated in the past. To successfully discharge this function, 
the commodity considered as money must not loose its real value rapidly due to inflation, 
but rather its value should be relatively stable over time.  
 
Mirroring the above functions to the Zimbabwean dollar for the period covering 2000 to 
end of January 2009, it can be noted without doubt that the country’s currency has failed 
to effectively perform these functions, especially for the period since 2007. The 
hyperinflation which characterized the country’s monetary system meant that the 
majority shunned the use of local currency in any transactions in favour of other stable 
currencies such as the US$ and South Africa rand, and also the majority of citizens 
started pricing their goods and services in foreign currencies, thus stripping the local 
currency (Z$) of its medium of exchange and unit of account functions. The same is true 
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that most Zimbabweans started storing their wealth in assets, jewelry and foreign 
currency rather than the Zimbabwean dollar, with most transactions either paid in cash or 
pegged in US dollar in case of credit purchases. As such, the local currency’s store of 
value and standard of deferred payment functions totally withered away. 
 
2.2 Characteristics of money  
 
Good money must have at least six characteristics, and these require the money to be (i) 
divisible, (ii) hard to counterfeit, (iii) durable, (iv) acceptable, (v) portable and (vi) stable 
in value. Although the Zimbabwean dollar before it was suspended from the country’s 
monetary system managed to have the first three characteristics, it nevertheless fall short 
in attaining the last three characteristics. Given that the last characteristics are the most 
important features required in any money system, the majority citizens were forced to 
reject it due to its rapid decline in its real value as well as the fact that it was increasingly 
becoming non-portable to use in transactions, with one having to carry trillions of 
Zimbabwean dollars to buy just a few groceries. 
 
3 POSSIBLE CURRENCY OPTIONS TO ADOPT  
 
There are three broad possible currency options that Zimbabwe can consider adopting in 
the aftermath of the multi-currency regime. These three are dollarization, joining the 
Common Monetary Area (CMA) and retaining the Zimbabwean dollar. Adoption of the 
last option (that is the Zimbabwean dollar) is further categorized into three possible 
management regimes which include currency board, free banking and Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe (RBZ). 
 
A general positive view is that Zimbabwe is not new to any of the suggested currency 
options and management regimes. For instance, between 1892 until 1940, the country’s 
banking system was a combination of free banking, dollarization and monetary area, 
where the last two systems were due to the fact that South Africa’s coins were legal 
tender in Zimbabwe, with a profit-sharing agreement for revenue seigniorage between the 
two countries (Hanke, 2008). From 1940 until 1956 the country operated a currency 
board system before shifting to central bank system under the Central African Federation 
(CFA), which consisted of the Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Nyasaland (now 
Malawi) and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). These systems are monetary 
arrangements that have proven history or records of success in providing reliable and low 
inflation currencies wherever they have been instituted. The main motive of instituting 
any one of these systems or a combination of them on the Zimbabwean economy is that 
such a system will have the ability of ensuring low inflation rates and a stable currency, 
and both conditions are necessary for economic growth and development.  
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3.1 Option 1: Dollarization  
 
Generally, dollarization is often used in a number of countries. Specifically, on an 
informal basis, the US dollar has circulated alongside national currencies in a number of 
countries, both developing and developed. It is only the formal dollarization, which 
seems to prop up much interest, especially in previously highly inflated countries such as 
Zimbabwe. Thus, to have a clear understanding of dollarization, three types of 
dollarization will be distinguished in this section.  
 
 
3.1.1 Definitions of dollarization13 
 
Official or full dollarization occurs when a country makes a foreign currency (currencies) 
full legal tender and reducing its own currency, if any, to a subsidiary role and being 
issued only in coins having small value. Generally, under such arrangement, there will be 
no risk of domestic currency, no currency risk, and therefore, no risk of currency crisis 
(Bogetic, 2000). With official dollarization, the foreign currency (currencies) adopted 
will not only be a legal tender for use among private parties, but will also be used by the 
government. One of the main features of full dollarization according to Borensztein and 
Berg (2000) is that, once adopted, it will be permanent, or nearly permanent. Compared 
to currency board, full dollarization will be relatively more difficult to reverse than doing 
away with or modifying a currency board.  
 
A variation of official or full dollarization is one called semi-official dollarization or 
bimonetary system, which exists when a foreign currency (currencies) is adopted as legal 
tender dominating bank deposits, but playing second role to the local currency in 
payment of such costs as wages, taxes, and day to day transaction such as transport, 
groceries, etc. Under this arrangement, the semi-official dollarizing countries will have 
their own central banks or monetary authorities with vested authorities to champion their 
own monetary policies. An example of this arrangement is the Common Monetary Area 
(CMA) in which Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland have allowed the South African rand 
to circulate in their territories as legal tender alongside their respective local currencies at 
one-to-one exchange rate with the South African rand (ZAR).  
 
Unofficial dollarization occurs when residents of a given country hold a large proportion 
of their financial wealth in foreign currency dominated assets even though foreign 
currency is not a legal tender according to that country’s financial or monetary laws. In 
this set-up, the dollar (or euro, or rand or any other foreign currency) will be widely used 
in private transactions as a medium of exchange, unit of account, store of value and 
standard of deferred payments.  
 
                                                 
13 It is important to note that the term “dollarization” no longer is the preserve of the US dollar only, but 
now includes use of other foreign currencies, such as euro (where the term ‘eurorization’ may apply), the 
South African rand (where the terms ‘randization’ or ‘randify’ may apply), and the British pound, among 
other currencies. 
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According to Bogetic (2000), unofficial dollarization may constitute holding of foreign 
currency in a variety of forms such as holding (i) of foreign currency bonds or other non-
cash assets; (ii) foreign currency cash, whether possessing it is legal or illegal; (iii) 
foreign currency deposits in domestic banks; and (iv) foreign currency deposits in foreign 
banks. In the case of Zimbabwe and during the hyperinflation period, majority citizens 
have managed to unofficially hold their foreign currency in a variety form of cash. This 
has been necessitated by a number of factors. Firstly, the fact that most goods and 
services since 2006 have been priced in foreign currency, so having foreign currency 
(USD or ZAR) has been a daily prerequisite for any transaction. Secondly, the fact that 
up to end of January 2009 laws pertaining to opening and operating of foreign currency 
accounts (FCAs) have been tightened up, making it very difficult even to withdraw 
foreign currency in any local bank once deposited, made it prudent for people to opt for 
holding the foreign currency in cash, and not deposit into local banks14. Lastly, given the 
severe and acute shortages of foreign currencies in the country, for one to decide to part 
away with his or her hard earned foreign currency through deposits into the local bank 
was inconceivable, as withdrawing it was a fruitless exercise as in 99 percent cases there 
was no foreign currency cash in the bank.  
 
 
3.1.2 Advantages of dollarization  
 
 
i. Low inflation 
 
Dollarization especially constituted at the right conversion rate has the ability to ensure 
low inflation to the dollarizing country and this has been evidenced in Zimbabwe since 
beginning of February 2009 after the adoption of the multi-currency regime. This comes 
from the fact that the dollarizing country’s inflation will be closely related to the anchor 
country’s inflation rate since these two countries will be using the same currency and 
applying relatively similar monetary policies (devised by the anchor country). For 
Zimbabwe this will be one of the most important advantage should the country officially 
dollarize given that hyperinflation has had unbearable social ramifications as majority of 
citizens have been pushed below the poverty datum line.  
 
 
ii. Reduced administrative expenses  
 
With dollarization there will be reduced administrative expenses. The reasoning here is 
that, the government of the dollarizing country will not incur the cost of maintaining an 
infrastructure dedicated solely to production and management of a separate national 
currency. For a country like Zimbabwe, these savings especially at such a time as this 
(where the country is coming out of severe hyperinflation) will be significant given that 
the country has been using a lot of resources over the years (e.g., money printed to 
                                                 
14 Since introduction of multiple currencies in the beginning of February 2009, FCAs have been liberalized, 
that is, anyone can open an FCA 
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purchase foreign currency on the parallel market) in chasing the little foreign currency in 
the hands of exporters, banks, and individuals.   
 
 
iii. Establishment of a sound financial sector  
 
Dollarization can also provide the firm basis for the recreation of a sounder financial 
sector. In this case dollarization will go beyond the mere adoption of a foreign currency, 
but will also mean financial integration with the anchor country and this will force 
domestic financial institutions to improve their efficiency and the quality of their 
services. Also dollarization implicitly implies a supposedly irreversible institutional 
change, which can act as a signal for permanent commitment to low inflation, fiscal 
responsibility, and transparency. Such a scenario would be an asset to a country such as 
Zimbabwe given that it has not enjoyed a consistent good reputation for price or fiscal 
stability. 
 
 
iv. Lower interest rates  
 
With dollarization there could be substantial reduction of interest rates for local 
borrowers. Dollarization establishes a stable relationship with a currency whose 
reputation is already well established and secure, thus lowering the level and volatility of 
domestic interest rates (real and nominal interest rates) by eliminating the risk of 
devaluation, thereby eliminating the devaluation-risk premium in local currency interest 
rates. Through dollarization, instead of investing heavily in efforts to build market 
confidence in its own monetary policy, a government can achieve instant credibility by 
“hiring” the respected anchor country’s central bank policy (Meyer, 2000). Given that 
Zimbabwe’s interest rates15 have been by far higher than the average rates applied in 
other neighbouring Southern African countries, any policy that reduces them is likely to 
be viewed as positive for the future prosperity of the country. 
 
 
v. Stimulate domestic long-term capital markets 
 
Dollarization spurs the development of domestic long-term capital markets by 
eliminating the risk of high inflation and currency devaluation. This comes from that fact 
that in a dollarization system, the dollarizing country cannot devalue the anchor currency 
it has adopted16. The confidence brought about by a stable adopted currency (among 
other factors) will motivate investors, both domestic and foreign, to participate in the 
country’s long-term capital market. Zimbabwe’s long-term capital markets have not been 
                                                 
15 By end of 2008 Zimbabwe’s interests were above 400 percent compared to SADC’s rates of below 20 
percent 
16 Devaluing any currency is the privilege of only one country, the owner of the currency. Thus, if 
Zimbabwe adopts the US dollar or South African rand, it will be only the US government which can 
devalue the US dollar or the South African government which can devalue the rand. 
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attractive to most investor for a long time (2000 – 2008), and thus any confidence 
restoration in this market through dollarization will be a benefit to the country.   
 
 
vi. Lower transaction costs 
 
Since the country will be using an anchor currency, which in most cases will be highly 
traded, and convertible, for instance the US dollar or the South African rand, when 
compared to the local currency, transaction costs in international trade and investments 
will be lowered, as there will be reduced need for currency conversions. During the 
country’s hyperinflation period, because of the non-convertibility of the Zimbabwean 
dollar, transaction costs of doing international business were very high when using the 
Zimbabwean dollar. For instance, if a buyer from Zimbabwe wanted to import from 
Japan, the buyer had to first convert the Zimbabwean dollars to US dollars, and then 
convent US dollars into Japanese yen. Because of hyperinflation and shortage of US 
dollar in Zimbabwe’s banks, the buyer had to purchase the US dollars from the expensive 
foreign currency black market and this meant exorbitant transactions costs. On the other 
hand, in the case of dollarization with US dollar as the anchor currency, the Zimbabwean 
buyer will simply do one conversion from US dollar to yen, thus reducing transaction 
costs (of importing in this example).  
 
 
3.1.3 Possible Disadvantages of dollarization  
 
The disadvantages of dollarization are demarcated into two categories, namely, economic 
and political drawbacks. Cohen (2000) argues that, in reality the more critical 
disadvantages of dollarization are political, not economic, and claims that the former 
drawbacks “are in fact the costs that are likely to matter most in practice”. 
 
3.1.3.1 Economic costs 
 
i. Forfeiture of autonomous monetary authority  
 
Adoption of dollarization implies the forfeiture of independent and autonomous monetary 
policy, since the dollarizing country will no longer exercise unilateral control over its 
own money supply or exchange rate. There were will be an inherent hierarchical 
relationship as such authority is ceded to the US Federal Reserve (if US dollar is the 
adopted currency) or South African Reserve Bank (if South African rand is the adopted 
currency), with little promise that the dollarizing country’s specific circumstances would 
be taken into account when monetary decisions are made in the anchor country.  
 
Nevertheless, in most cases when a country considers instituting dollarization, it is likely 
that much of the country’s monetary autonomy will already have been greatly eroded, as 
the case with Zimbabwe, which was more than 95 percent dollarized (informally, and 
semi-officially) by of end of December 2008. Generally, the greater the degree of 
currency substitution that has already occurred due to informal dollarization reflecting 
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market pressures and preferences, the greater is the degree of constraint imposed even 
now on a government’s ability to manage macroeconomic conditions and hence the 
smaller will be the actual loss of monetary autonomy if the local money is formally 
replaced by dollarization. For Zimbabwe, informal dollarization has rendered monetary 
pronouncements useless; hence formal adoption of dollarization may not bear much 
difference as the country has already implicitly/seemingly forfeited its monetary authority 
independence.  
 
 
ii. Loss of seigniorage revenue 
 
The major cost of dollarization especially to a country like Zimbabwe that has been 
generating revenue through money printing for economic survival over the years, is 
forfeiture of a potential tool for underwriting public expenditures, that is, the forgoing of 
the capacity to create money, otherwise known as seigniorage. Seigniorage is the interest 
income a central bank earns by issuing non-interest bearing money to buy interest-
bearing assets (Burdekin, 2008). A country’s central bank is part of its government; 
hence that income is part of the government’s revenues. When a country officially 
dollarizes, its central bank has to withdraw the local currency from circulation and 
replace it with US dollars or the anchor currency. To get those US dollars, the central 
bank will have to sell some of its assets, normally interest-bearing, US dollar-
denominated assets. The result is that the central bank’s interest income declines.  
 
In other words, seigniorage can thus be considered as an alternative source of revenue for 
the state beyond what can be raised via taxation or by borrowing from financial markets 
at home or abroad. What cannot be paid for with tax receipts or borrowed funds can be 
paid for, in effect, by money-printing. Dollarization automatically terminates that revenue 
unless explicitly offset by some kind of agreed formula for seigniorage sharing with the 
anchor country. But once again, in reality, the potential loss of seigniorage will be 
smaller; the greater is the degree of prior informal dollarization. In the case of Zimbabwe 
with wide spread informal dollarization, this loss will thus be very small.  
 
 
iii. Loss of the ability to use inflation tax 
 
Although somewhat close to the above drawback, with dollarization, a country will loose 
its ability of using the inflation tax (“revenue of last resort”) by printing money in a 
national emergency. Normally, a government levies an implicit inflation tax when it 
issues too much new money that it generates inflation. With inflation, the real value of 
money will diminish over time; thus inflation behaves like a tax levied on those who hold 
the local money. When a country officially dollarizes, its government can no longer issue 
new money, so it can no longer use the inflation tax (Meyer, 2000). Zimbabwe has 
heavily been using this inflation tax for the past few years (2004 – 2008) and adoption of 
dollarization will surely be a cost.  
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iv. Loss of lender of last resort 
 
Dollarization relinquishes the formal lender of last resort function of the dollarizing 
country (through its central bank) since in adopting a foreign currency, the latter country 
also gives up a central bank capable of discounting freely in times of financial crisis. 
Theoretically, it follows that domestic banks may become more exposed to potential 
liquidity risks. In practical terms, however, this alleged cost could be rather easily offset 
by a number of channels. First, dollarization normally eliminates or minimizes the overall 
need for international reserves, given that a share of external transactions that previously 
used to involve foreign currency can now be treated as the equivalent of domestic 
transactions. Thus, a percentage of the central bank’s dollar assets could then be devoted 
to a public stabilization fund that will bail out domestic financial institutions under stress. 
Another channel is that a contingency fund could be built up over time from tax revenues, 
or flexible credit lines with foreign banks or monetary authorities could be negotiated, 
using future tax revenues or seigniorage sharing as collateral. Thus in reality, this 
disadvantage is not a serious drawback for Zimbabwe if it considers adopting 
dollarization17.  
 
 
v. Unable to adjust exchange rate in critical circumstances  
 
The country will be unable to adjust its exchange rate in peculiar circumstances when that 
might be helpful to its economic activities. In effect, the fact that the economies of the 
anchor and dollarizing countries generally differ, requires that, appropriate policies, 
including exchange rate adjustment be tailor-made to suit the dollarizing country 
scenario. This loss of control over exchange rate policy may expose the country’s 
economy to external shocks such as primary commodity prices and food price, especially 
given that the world trading system is likely to open up further due to globalization.  
 
 
3.1.3.2 Political costs  
 
i. Loss of nation symbol 
 
Among the most tangible national symbols which differentiate one country from the rest 
includes flags, national anthems, postage stamps, public architecture and money being 
one of the most potent one. According to Cohen (2000), the ability of money to 
symbolize the uniqueness of national identity stems from two ways. Firstly, since the 
government or its central bank issues its preserved currency notes, money plays the role 
of reminding citizens on daily basis of their loyalty, connectedness and oneness with the 
country. Secondly, the fact that it is pervasively used on daily transactions, a currency 
highlights the fact that everyone is part of the same social entity. Thus adoption of 
                                                 
17 The situation of the loss of lender of last resort in a set up like a monetary union is slightly different with 
the one when a country dollarize. In the former, regional monetary policy to be implemented in signatory 
members is normally crafted by all participating regional members and there will be clearly laid out rules 
regarding the function of lender of last resort.   
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foreign currency through dollarization entails loss of these prerogatives. Specifically, 
given Zimbabwe government's foreign policy thrust of sovereignty, this will be a major 
blow not only to its national symbol but also to its sovereignty.  
 
 
ii. Loss of insurance against risk 
 
Zimbabwean government whose budget has over the past years depended heavily on 
money printing, preservation of a national currency acts as a kind of insurance policy 
against risk, where seigniorage is a marginal source of revenue for the state. Although 
money printing has wrecked havoc in accelerating hyperinflation in Zimbabwe, it can 
however serve as an emergency source of revenue in the face of genuine problems, thus 
providing an option of finding needed purchasing power quickly when confronted with 
unexpected contingencies. With seigniorage, needed resources can be gathered together 
instantaneously without being forced to wait for tax returns to be filed or loans to be 
negotiated. Referring to seigniorage, Keynes (1920) noted that, “A government can live 
by this means when it can live by no other.” Thus, adoption of another currency means 
this privilege will be completely eroded away. 
 
 
iii. Foreign policy and diplomacy  
 
 From a foreign policy and diplomatic perspective, the ability of any sovereign state to 
have its own national currency reduces the risks of external dependence or threat. 
Autonomous national monetary authority ensures that a county will not rely on external 
sources for its most vital economic resources. With full dollarization, this insulation is 
lost. At the same time, the anchor country whose money is used to dollarize in the 
dollarizing country gains an authoritative device, which it can employ to influence the 
dependent dollarized economy. For instance, in the CMA, South Africa’s monetary 
policy and changes in exchange rate influence monetary policy and exchange rate 
changes in Namibia and Lesotho. Given that these countries uses South African Reserve 
Bank (SARB) as their lender of last resort, when interest rates are changed in South 
Africa, CMA member countries automatically and instantly changes their rates to reflect 
the changes done by South Africa.   
 
 
3.1.3.3 Factors to be considered in assessing Zimbabwe’s readiness for dollarization 
 
Given that Zimbabwe is coming out of severe hyperinflation, and that dollarization 
provides a possible panacea to restore credibility and confidence in the monetary system, 
it is important to digest the various criteria to assess the extent to which the country is 
ready to dollarize. To this end, this section provides some factors that need to be 
considered. 
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3.1.3.3.1 Monetary related factors 
 
i. Policy credibility 
 
Countries where historical evidence especially in the monetary area shows that policy 
makers have suffered from a lack of policy credibility, are potential beneficiaries of rule-
based monetary regime such as a currency board or dollarization given these systems’ 
imposed discipline. Lack of policy credibility is normally measured by looking at some 
of the following variables: the country’s experience with inflation (with Zimbabwe havin 
been through hyperinflation); a past history of exchange rate instability and crises (with 
Zimbabwe having to deal with over seven exchange rates ranging from the official, bank, 
parallel market, gold, tobacco, import/export rate among others)18; the existence of 
previous financial and banking crises (with Zimbabwe having placed at least five banks19 
under curatorship since 2004); the degree of unofficial dollarization (where between 2006 
and 2008 use and application of foreign currency in any transaction was a street choice 
free for any scenario); the country’s inability to borrow long-term in domestic currency 
(with borrowing being a major liability in Zimbabwe from any bank or micro finance 
institution); and a defunct fiscal record characterized by high budget deficits (with 
Zimbabwe’s deficits have been averaging more than six percent of the country’s GDP 
since 1999 according to figures from RBZ). In a nutshell, all these variables perfectly suit 
the situation of Zimbabwe for the past five or so years. Hence, judging by this criterion, 
Zimbabwe is ripe for either formal dollarization or currency board.  
 
 
ii. History of monetary instability 
 
Generally, countries that need the most imposed rules, for instance through adoption of 
dollarization are those that have had a history of monetary instability. Specifically, 
dollarization is considered as the most appropriate for countries that have had high 
monetary instability but now have a competent and stable governments or are in the 
process of instituting such government with deep popular support that are determined to 
commit to rigid monetary rules to maintain long-run policy stability. Zimbabwe situation 
portrays this description, and as such, is a suitable candidate for dollarization.  
 
 
iii. Current exchange rate regime 
 
Although a country can adopt dollarization starting from any exchange rate regime, a 
successful past experience with credibly fixed exchange rates is a step forward. Past 
experience with fixed exchange rates, according to Roubini (2001) indicates three things. 
Firstly, it signals that the country has already shown its commitment to a stable currency. 
Secondly, it indicates the country’s willingness to pay any costs associated with fixed 
exchange rates, and lastly, it is a sign to indicate that the country will unlikely experience 
                                                 
18 These rates have been applied especially between 2004 and end of January 2009 at different time periods 
19 According to RBZ, the following banks have been once (or are currently) under curatorship: Barbican 
Bank, CFX Bank, Royal Bank, Time Bank, Trust Bank 
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further large costs from giving up altogether a national currency. Another advantage of 
previous implementation of fixed exchange rates is that the additional transitional costs 
associated with moving to dollarization from fixed rates are lower than when starting 
from more flexible exchange rate regimes. Zimbabwe, although its previous and current 
fixed exchange rates regimes have not been successful, it nonetheless has implemented 
these policies with the intention of stabilizing its currency. Thus, to a greater extent, the 
country, by inferring from this requisite factor is a potential candidate for dollarization.  
 
 
iv. Reserve coverage of monetary base 
 
Theoretically, literature points that another criterion for dollarization is that the foreign 
exchange reserves of the country to implement dollarization should at least cover the 
monetary base (or the currency in circulation)20 (Roubini, 2001). Nevertheless, one 
branch of literature suggests that potential countries for dollarization which do not satisfy 
this requirement may consider borrowing the necessary reserves from official or private 
creditors (Meyer, 2000). These reserves are needed to convert the money base into US 
dollars (after dollarization). Currently, Zimbabwe’s foreign currency reserves have been 
exempt for a number of years to such an extent that the country struggle to buy (or 
import) essential products such as medicine and electricity, among other imports. IMF 
(2009) statistical figures shows Zimbabwe gross official reserves at US$58 million and 
US$5.8 million for the end of year periods 2007 and 2008, respectively. At the same 
time, no rational official or private creditors are currently willing to lend to the current 
Zimbabwean government. However, international creditors21 have indicated willingness 
to provide credit lines only to business entities were they are assured of getting profitable 
returns at mutually agreed rates. Thus by considering this criterion, dollarization in 
Zimbabwe may be successful.   
 
 
v. Soundness of the banking system 
 
Existence of a sound, competitive, well supervised and well regulated banking system is 
an important ingredient for the successful implementation of dollarization. A weak 
banking system may lead to financial panic and serious economic distress in the case 
where the banking sector experiences systemic crises that are fiscally costly especially 
given the absence of a strong lender of last resort facility under dollarization. However, 
this weak banking system maybe helped by the presence of foreign banks22 in a 
dollarizing economy and in the case of Zimbabwe, presence of foreign banks will also go 
a long way in stabilizing the country’s financial sector whose banking sector has been 
generally weak. For foreign banks play the important roles of reducing the risk of 
banking crises and providing implicit lender of last resort support through home country 
                                                 
20 Whether this will be sufficient or not will depend of the country’s import basket 
21 These includes creditors from South Africa and China 
22 It is important to note that although these foreign banks, other than having good capital, may bring into 
the country bank risk management best practices; the assumption is that their positive contribution will 
outweigh their negative contribution to the overall economy and financial sector. 
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head offices. Currently, foreign banks operating in the country includes Barclays, 
Standard Chartered, Stanbic, among others, and these may act as stabilizers. Thus, 
presence of these foreign banks makes Zimbabwe a potential candidate for dollarization.  
 
 
vi. Extent of informal dollarization 
 
The greater is the magnitude of unofficial dollarization, the smaller will be the benefits of 
exchange rate devaluation and the greater are will be the potential benefits of formal 
dollarization. In a situation where the US dollar (or other currencies) is already used as a 
unit of account, means of payment and store of value, the costs of a transition to formal 
dollarization will be minimized. Zimbabwe is currently 100 percent (unofficially) 
dollarized, and thus any formalization will just cement the current situation. Thus, 
according to this requisite fact, Zimbabwe is currently the most ideal candidate for 
dollarization. 
 
   
vii. Ability to provide lender of last resort functions after dollarization 
 
Although dollarization limits a country’s central bank’s ability to provide lender of last 
resort services to its banking system, such a function can be performed even in a 
dollarized economy through a variety of channels. First, in the case where foreign 
reserves are in excess of what is normally needed to cover the monetary base, such excess 
reserves can be used to cover some components of monetary aggregates including 
demand deposits and other longer-term liquid liabilities of the banking system. For 
Zimbabwe, this option is not available given that its foreign currency reserves have long 
dried up. Second, the country instituting dollarization can build liquid reserves through 
borrowing either from the private sector (private contingent credit lines) or from the 
international financial institutions. Such international institutions in the case of 
Zimbabwe include International Monetary Fund (IMF), African development Bank 
(AfDB), among other potential institutions. Again, this option may not be available for 
Zimbabwe given that no rational lender is currently willing to lend money to Zimbabwe 
because of the previous government’s mismanagement23. Third, changes in reserve 
requirement ratios24 may provide further liquidity to a banking system under pressure. 
This may be a possible available option for Zimbabwe if it dollarize. Fourth, in the 
situation where there is provision of seigniorage revenue-sharing arrangement with the 
anchor currency’s country, the discounted value of the stream of future seigniorage 
payments could be used as collateral for lines of credit with private and/or official 
creditors. This option is to be debated between Zimbabwe and the country with the 
                                                 
23 Some countries such as China have however indicated willingness of lending to Zimbabwe despite the 
latter country’s mis-management. China’s willingness may be strategic, given its interest in Zimbabwe’s 
mining and infrastructure projects. 
24 Reserve requirement ratio (RRR) is the percentage of deposited money that a bank is required (by 
monetary authorities, e.g., RBZ in case of Zimbabwe) to keep and not to lend in the form of loans. For 
instance, is the RRR is 10 percent, it means that for a $10 deposited, a bank will be allowed only to lend a 
maximum of $0.90 and keep $0.10 in its coffers (or lodge it with central bank). This RRR is required to 
ensure than depositors will get their cash at any time they visit the bank for withdrawal. 
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currency to be adopted in case Zimbabwe decides to formally dollarize, and as such we 
consider it not available as of now.  
 
 
viii. Revenue cost of seigniorage loss 
 
Dollarization that occurs without seigniorage-sharing with the anchor currency would 
imply a revenue cost in the form of seigniorage revenue loss. For countries in which 
seigniorage accounts for a significant fraction of government revenues, such loss has 
serious fiscal consequences and needs to be compensated by an increase in non-
seigniorage revenues. If seigniorage revenues are significant, this switch in sources of 
revenue may require tax reforms to reduce a structural reliance on seigniorage. In the 
absence of revenue-sharing, the seigniorage loss is partly reduced if the dollarized 
country imposes non-remunerated reserve requirements on its banking system 
(essentially another form of taxation of banks) and thus the central bank can earn the 
interest rate on the non-currency component of the monetary base. To mitigate this 
potential revenue loss, the Zimbabwe government can impose the non-remunerated 
reserve requirements. 
 
 
ix. Central bank solvency in the absence of seigniorage sharing 
 
Another version of seigniorage loss to be well thought-out is how such a loss affects the 
solvency of the central bank of a dollarizing economy. Under normal circumstance, the 
discounted value of future seigniorage is considered as an asset for the central banks, 
which does not appear in the current balance sheets of central banks. This generally 
means that central banks officially have often negative net worth and this will not be a 
worry in a case where a country has its own currency since the discounted value of the 
stream of seigniorage revenues is a substantial asset that is not shown in such balance 
sheets. In the case of Zimbabwe, its central bank’s balance sheet shows negative net 
worth, a situation that indicates insolvency of the RBZ. This apparent insolvency of RBZ 
becomes a hurdle if Zimbabwe decides to dollarize, especially in the case where 
seigniorage will not be shared with the anchor country and in such a case a negative net 
worth of RBZ will become a real form of insolvency. Thus, the ability of RBZ to provide 
credible lender of last resort services (if authorized to do so by dollarization imposed 
rules) may thus be further undermined. Using this criterion, implementation of 
dollarization by Zimbabwe may not be a successful adventure.  
 
 
x. State of public finances 
 
The greater is the budget deficit and the stock of public debt, the greater will be the risk 
that dollarization might fail. This comes from the fact that unsustainable fiscal conditions 
may eventually tempt policy makers to reverse dollarization, return to a domestic 
currency so as to be able to run again the printing process and regain access to the 
inflation tax. At the same time acute fiscal problems may also weaken the confidence of 
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the public in the fiscal authorities and lead to a foreign debt-related financial crisis where 
the country may end up stopping honouring financial creditors25. Zimbabwe is currently 
one of the countries with very high budget deficit and stock of public debt26 as well as 
severe fiscal problems caused among other things by persistence hyperinflation in the 
past few years. Thus using this criterion, implementing dollarization may not achieve the 
desired end.  
 
 
3.1.3.3.2 Supply side and trade related factors 
 
i. Ability to successfully pursue counter-cyclical monetary policy27 
 
Literature on the subject matter has suggested that some small open economies with a 
history of high inflation and high exchange rate volatility are normally unable to use 
monetary policy for countercyclical purposes. Generally, presence of a combination of 
unofficial dollarization, lack of policy credibility and wage indexation28 are some of the 
complex issues which may render monetary policy ineffective to counter cyclical shocks. 
The ability of Zimbabwe on this factor is difficult to access, especially given that ever 
since the high inflationary period there have been a number of factors bedeviling the 
country to such an extent that its monetary policy has been reduced to printing money 
and instituting some caveat policies to chase the few US dollars earned by exporters. By 
and large, the country has not shown any ability to pursue counter-cyclical monetary 
policy to date, although there is a higher possibility of such policies in the near future 
especially with the new government of national unity (GNU)29.  
  
 
                                                 
25 A good example is Mexico’s 1982 foreign-debt crisis. The Mexican government borrowed heavily from 
foreign sources to such an extent that its foreign debt was around US$70 billion in January 1982 and 
increased to US$80 billion by October same year. Because the country could not repay the foreign debt 
accord to time lines, on 6th September 1982, it suspended all payments that we done to recoup foreign debt 
(Mabry, 1982) 
26 Zimbabwe’s total external debt was US$5.3 billion (or 149% of GDP) by end of 2007, US$6 billion (or 
185% of GDP) and is estimated to be US$6.5 billion (or 185% of GDP) by end of 2009, IMF (2009). 
 
27 Counter-cyclical policies are aimed to go in opposite direction with trends in economic activities. A good 
example is the ball-out packages that have been rolled out by European countries and USA over the past 
few months. As a result of downward trends (recession) in these countries, such things as low product 
demand and rise in unemployment, these governments has instituted counter-cyclical policies in the form of 
ball-outs to come out of these problems, For UK, the ‘scrap car’ scheme were citizens are given advanced 
2000 pound sterling by a government scheme for purchase of a new car is aimed at stimulating the low car 
sales. This increased demand will encourage more production, which in turn will mean more people 
employed. USA and Germany are some of the countries which have these ‘scrap car’ schemes (though in 
various names). 
 
28 Wage indexation refers to a situation were the percentage increase in wages reflect percentage increase in 
inflation. A one-on-one indexation means that if inflation increase by 20%, wages will also increase by 
20%. 
29 On 13th February 2009, Zimbabwe’s major political parties formed a coalition government, popularly 
called government of national unity (GNU) 
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ii. Correlation of the business cycle with the anchor currency’s country  
 
In a situation where the dollarized country’s business cycle is highly correlated with the 
one of the anchor country there will be no need for exchange rate adjustment. With such 
synchronization, any shock hitting a common currency area will be common to all the 
economies in the area. As such there will be reduced need (if any) for currency 
adjustment and in such a situation the monetary policy of the anchor country will likely 
be appropriate for the dollarized economy. The extent of business cycle synchronization 
between the dollarizing and anchor countries in turn depends on real and structural 
factors such as the degree of trade integration and the similarity in production structure 
between the two countries. As alluded to in the immediate previous paragraph, due to 
chaotic structural changes which happened in Zimbabwe since 2000 to date, there has not 
been any serious business cycle to talk about since production has been dwindling year 
after year. Thus, under this criterion, one can safely say the country’s business cycle is 
not synchronized to any of the potential two anchor countries (United States and South 
Africa).  
 
 
iii. Trade integration with the anchor currency’s country 
 
Existence of a potential dollarizing country’s greater share of its exports and imports that 
is accounted for by trade with the potential anchor country, the better it will be for the 
former country to dollarize. This is important as it will ensure that the dollarizing country 
economically linked to the anchor country, hence in such as case adopting the latter 
country’s currency will likely work for the former part.  Financial and capital integration 
also correlate with trade integration. Although there is not much in terms of volumes 
from Zimbabwe’s side in these variables, the country is however highly integrated with 
South Africa, and not USA, in its trade interactions30. Considering this criterion, one can 
conclude that Zimbabwe is a potential candidate for dollarization using South Africa as 
the anchor country and the latter country’s rand as the chosen currency to dollarize with 
(that is, randization).  
 
 
iv. Vulnerability to terms of trade shocks 
 
Vulnerability to terms of trade shocks is normally greater for countries whose exports are 
concentrated in a narrow range of often-primary commodity exports. A small country and 
a price taker31 in the market for exports and imports imply that the country may not be 
able to modify its terms of trade. Under such circumstances, the benefits of dollarization 
                                                 
30 For the five year period, 2000 to 2004, Zimbabwe exported an annual average of US$576 million worth 
of products to South Africa and US$73.4 million to USA. For the same period, the country’s annual 
average imports were US$917 million from South Africa and US$57.4 million from USA (TIPS database. 
Available at: www.tips.org.za.) 
31 Price taker in this case means that prices for export products from Zimbabwe are determined at world 
market through demand and supply, and Zimbabwe will only either take the price or leave it (it can not set 
the price say for its tobacco, cotton, gold etc) 
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will be potentially larger for such a small open economy32. Zimbabwe’s main exports 
(though they are currently at minimum levels) are primary commodities including 
tobacco, sugar and cotton. Thus, inferring from this criteria, the country is a suitable 
candidate for dollarization.  
 
 
3.1.3.3.3 Other factors 
 
i. Flexibility of labour markets 
 
Enough flexibility in labor markets implies that any external shocks which require a 
change in real wages and/or mobility of labor across sectors will not have lasting effects 
on the rate of unemployment. This flexibility may include the following types: (i) 
downward flexibility of nominal wages (to induce a reduction in real wage if that is 
required), (ii) labor mobility across sectors and regions if changes in relative prices 
require a reallocation of factors of production, and (iii) low hiring and firing costs to 
ensure labor market flexibility (Roubini, 2001). Although there may be some rigidities in 
Zimbabwe’s labour market, generally, the country has relatively enough labour market 
flexibility and thus judging by this factor, the country is ready for dollarization. 
 
 
ii. Degree of labour migration 
 
Although free labour mobility between the country considering dollarization and the 
anchor country is an important, such free mobility is generally ruled out as there are 
restrictions on cross-national labor migration. Nevertheless, in practice the degree of 
labor mobility may be significant as there will also be a significant number of legal (and 
illegal) temporary and permanent migrant workers who can move between the anchor 
country and their country of origin. This is the present situation between Zimbabwe (the 
potential country to dollarize) and South Africa (the potential anchor country). It is 
believed that there are currently more than three million Zimbabweans (a quarter of the 
population) living and working in South Africa, both on legal and illegal basis, with the 
latter migrants being the majority. Thus, one can safely say, there is relatively less 
restrained labour mobility from Zimbabwe into South Africa and more so with South 
Africa having suspended visa requirements for Zimbabwe seeking to enter or work for 
shorter period of 90 days or less.  
 
 
iii. Degree of capital mobility 
 
Successfulness of dollarization is also enhanced by a higher degree of capital mobility 
into the dollarizing economy, with capital mobility measured by flows of inward foreign 
direct investment (FDI). For the past decade, there has been no meaningful inward FDI 
                                                 
32 One measure of openness used in literature is percentage ratio of total trade (exports plus imports) to 
GDP. For the time analyzed in this study (i.e., 2000 to end of January 2009), Zimbabwe’s annual openness 
ratio was averaging above 67% using IMF database. 
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into Zimbabwe due to a number of factors including political, hyperinflation and general 
mismanagement of the economy. Thus, according to this criterion and as of now, 
implementation of dollarization may not be successful33.  
 
 
iv. Implicit or explicit fiscal federalism and income insurance schemes 
 
In a domestic currency union, for instance USA’s federal system, misfortunes 
experienced in one region are squarely (or partly) compensated by a federal (or central) 
system of tax and transfers. With dollarization, such an automatic insurance scheme 
disappears, as monetary integration will not be associated with fiscal integration since the 
dollarizing and anchor countries will be having different fiscal policies. However, there 
may be some implicit forms of income insurance that may still be at work. For instance, 
if a dollarizing country has a large number of migrant workers in the anchor country, 
worker remittances may be an important source of income for the dollarizing economy. 
Zimbabwe is fortunate to have a sizeable proportion of its working population (nearly 50 
percent of its labour force) working in diaspora, including such countries as South Africa, 
UK, Botswana, to mention just a few countries. Although Zimbabweans in diaspora have 
been sending remittances, they have not been sending them through formal banks or 
money transfer channels due to the perennial central bank (RBZ) fixed exchange rate 
which individuals have rationally evaded for their unfairness (Bracking and Sachikonye, 
2008). Most Zimbabweans have been sending money through bus drivers (especially 
those in South Africa), relatives and other money transfer agencies whose exchange rates 
were closer to the daily black market foreign exchange rates that were prevailing in 
Harare at the time of sending the money. Nevertheless, if the country formally dollarize, 
they will not be any problem with exchange rate and there is 100 percent probability that 
these remittances may come into Zimbabwe through formal bank channels.  
 
 
v. Political factors  
 
The success of dollarization requires a high level of majority support. Normally, 
countries entangled in deep political divisions, with significant political minorities 
opposed to dollarization, countries that lack stable democratic institutions; with a history 
of political turmoil may not be good candidates for dollarization. In such a situation, there 
will not be any political support for dollarization and there would be a greater probability 
that groups opposed to dollarization may at some point reverse the dollarization when 
they come to power. Zimbabwe at present is caught up in a dilemma where confidence in 
the use of the local currency has been eroded. Business and industry are pressuring for 
dolarization. Opposition to adoption of dollarisation might come from politicians who 
have been direct beneficiaries of the skewed predicament of hyperinflation obtaining the 
foreign currency at close to ridiculous, subsidized exchange rates. 
                                                 
33 This may however change particularly if property rights issues via the empowerment legislation are 
addressed. This was the case with post conflict countries such as Angola, Mozambique have seen a surge in 
their natural resource sectors such as oil; gas etc. Zimbabwe relatively good financial and physical 
infrastructure could support this trend well. 
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Given the above analysis, Table 2 therefore provides a summarized version of the 
country’s readiness for dollarization from the arguments presented above.  
 
 
Table 2: Zimbabwe’s readiness for dollarization   
Criterion Factor  Ready 
Monetary, financial and fiscal factors  
1 Policy credibility Yes 
2 Inflation experience  Yes 
3 Current exchange rate regime Yes 
4 Reserve coverage of monetary base No 
5 Soundness of the banking system Yes 
6 Extent of informal dollarization Yes 
7 Ability to provide lender of last resort functions after dollarization  No 
8 Revenue cost of seigniorage loss Yes 
9 Central bank solvency in the absence of seigniorage No 
10 State of public finance No 
Supply side and trade related factors  
11 Ability to successfully pursue counter-cyclical monetary policy No 
12 Correlation of the business cycle with the South Africa (or USA) No 
13 Trade integration with South Africa (or USA) Yes 
14 Vulnerability to terms of trade shocks Yes 
15 Openness to trade Yes 
Other factors 
16 Flexibility of labour markets  Yes 
17 Degree of labour migration Yes 
18 Degree of capital mobility No 
19 Implicit or explicit fiscal federalism and income insurance schemes Yes 
20 Political factors  No 
 Overall Readiness  YES 
Source: author summary from analysis presented above  
 
3.2 Option 2: Joining Common Monetary Area (CMA)  
 
Another possible option that Zimbabwe can consider is to join the Common Monetary 
Area (CMA) currently consisting of South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. In 
such a system, Zimbabwe will adopt the South African rand as the legal tender, operating 
alongside the local currency, the Zimbabwean dollar on a one-to-one exchange rate with 
the South African rand.   
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3.2.1 Pros and Cons of joining CMA 
 
3.2.1.1 Advantages of joining CMA 
 
The advantages of joining CMA are almost the same as those explained under 
dollarization and are just listed to include the following: 
 
i. Lower inflation rates 
ii. Reduced administrative expenses 
iii. Low interest rates 
iv. Stimulation of domestic long-term capital markets 
v. Reduced financial fragility 
vi. Lower transaction costs 
 
 
3.2.1.2 Disadvantages of joining CMA 
 
i. Possibility of not accepted 
 
One big problem with this option is that CMA countries may not accept to admit 
Zimbabwe as one of its potential CMA member. Whether the reasons will be political or 
otherwise, there is a strong possibility of this happening. The truth of the matter is that 
the CMA is already a “moving ship”, with its evolved and long established goals, rules, 
preferences and oneness that may not be altered without vigorous and protracted 
negotiations.  
 
 
ii. Loss of monetary policy autonomy  
 
Given the historic evolvement of CMA, currently the monetary policy formulated by the 
South African government, specifically for its economic is by default applied in the other 
CMA member countries. Thus joining CMA will imply that Zimbabwe will forfeiture its 
monetary policy autonomy to South Africa, without any guarantee that its specific needs 
will be taken into account.  
 
 
iii. Seigniorage loss and revenue sharing formula  
 
Another potential problem will be on how to deal with the issue of revenue sharing. 
Currently, the formula has been agreed upon as reflected in the CMA agreement, and this 
formula has taken the interests of all CMA members into account. Now when Zimbabwe 
decides to join, this issue will have to be amicably negotiated and that might result in 
some problems and reduction of seigniorage revenue to Zimbabwe.   
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3.3 Option 3: Reintroducing the Zimbabwean dollar 
 
The other option will be to reintroduce the Zimbabwean dollar (Z$) instead of opting for 
another currency (e.g., US$ or rand) or currency system (e.g., joing the CMA). 
Nevertheless, given the loss of credibility of the local currency in sight of the majority 
citizens, its come back can only be viable when a management system has been put in 
place to ensure that the currency will not return to the same problems which forced the 
country to abandon it in the first place. This section therefore details three possible 
management systems that the country can consider to institute for the sake of managing 
the reintroduced Zimbabwean dollar. These systems are the currency board, free banking 
and central bank (RBZ).  
 
3.3.1 System 1: Currency board  
 
In the beginning God created sterling and the franc. On the second day He 
created the currency board and, Lo, money was well managed. On the third day 
God decided that man should have free will and so created the budget deficit. On 
the fourth day, however, God looked upon His work and was dissatisfied. It was 
not enough. So, on the fifth day God created a central bank to validate the sins of 
man. On the sixth day God completed His work by creating man and giving him 
dominion over all God’s creatures. Then, while God rested on the seventh day, 
man created inflation and the balance-of-payments problem (Peter B. Kenen, 
1978: 13)) 
 
An orthodox currency board arrangement is a monetary system where the board issues 
domestic notes and coins that are fully backed by sufficient holdings of a foreign reserve 
currency, thus making the domestic currency convertible on demand into a foreign 
anchor currency at a fixed exchange rate. The foreign currency reserve levels are 
normally set by law and are equal to 100 percent, or slightly higher, of the country’s 
monetary liabilities (notes, coins, and if permitted deposits) (Hanke, 2002a). Thus, under 
this system, the currency board does not actively determine the monetary base, but rather 
the referred fixed exchange rate and the required 100 percent holdings of foreign 
currency to back domestic currency convertibility preclude the board from changing 
(increasing or decreasing) the monetary base at its own discretion. The main 
responsibility of the currency board therefore is to convert the domestic currency it issues 
into the anchor foreign currency at a fixed exchange rate. As such, the amount of 
domestic currency circulating in the market is a function of the invisible hand that is the 
forces of demand and supply for the domestic currency.  
 
Although this system outlaws independent monetary policy, it however permits earned 
seigniorage revenue gained through investing the foreign reserve holding in interest-
bearing paper, like U.S.A treasury bills. Burdekin (2008) argues that this system permits 
small economies reap the benefits of seigniorage without necessarily compromising the 
discipline afforded by being linked to the opted foreign currency anchor.    
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3.3.1.1 Salient features of currency board  
 
The salient features of a currency board are summarized in Table 3. To put these self-
explanatory important characteristics into comparative scenario, parallel features of a 
typical central bank are also presented in the same table.  
  
As the table shows, a currency board presents features that are normally propagators of 
economic stability, especially in the case where the central bank has totally failed to 
discharge its mandate of being a pillar of economic viability and prosperity through its 
monetary policies. For Zimbabwe, to help contextualize the extent to which the central 
bank has failed to be a pillar of the country’s economic success, but rather has acted as an 
agent to the country’s economic demise, information on each feature of the country’s 
central bank has been bracketed as shown in column three (3) of the table. Thus, given 
this extremely poor performance of Zimbabwe’s Central Bank and at the same time, the 
fact that, “All currency boards have performed well, when compared to central banks” 
(Hanke, 2002), it becomes paramount for the country to consider adoption of such a 
system.  
 
Table 3: A typical currency board versus a typical central bank 
 Typical Currency Board Typical Central Bank 
1 Usually supplies notes and 
coins 
Supplies notes, coins, and deposits (Until end of January 
2009 rue for Zimbabwe, though RBZ had voluntarily stopped 
supplying coins since they have been rendered void) 
2 Fixed exchange rate with 
reserve currency 
Pegged or floating exchange rate (Zimbabwe used to have 
pegged exchange rate before multi-currency regime) 
3 No conflicts between 
exchange rate policies and 
monetary policies 
Frequent conflicts between exchange rate policies and 
monetary policies (currently true for Zimbabwe)  
4 No balance of payments 
crisis 
Frequent balance of payment crisis (replicates the 
Zimbabwean scenario)  
5 Foreign reserves of 100 
percent 
Variable foreign reserves (currently zero reserves for 
Zimbabwe) 
6 Cannot become insolvent Can become insolvent (reflective of Zimbabwe) 
7 Does not hold domestic 
assets 
Does hold domestic assets (looking at RBZ’s Balance sheet, 
its currently true for Zimbabwe) 
8 Full convertibility Limited convertibility (Zimbabwe’s currency was non-
convertible) 
9 Rule-bound monetary 
system 
Discretionary monetary system (This was true in the case for 
Zimbabwe) 
10 Not a lender of last resort  Lender of last resort (The Central Bank holds that function in 
Zimbabwe) 
 
11 Does not regulate 
commercial banks 
Often regulates commercial banks (the RBZ has recurrently 
regulated the operations of Commercial Banks) 
12 Transparent Opaque (in the Zimbabwe case, currently no openness exists, 
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rather the institution appears to be run by instinct) 
13 Immune from corruption 
scandals 
Prone to corruption scandals (a number of corruption 
scandals involving RBZ officials have been reported) 
14 Protected from political 
pressure 
Politicized (In Zimbabwe, RBZ is highly politicized and 
currently controlled by one political party) 
15 High credibility  Low credibility (No credibility in the case of Zimbabwe) 
16 Earns seigniorage only 
from interest 
Earns seigniorage from interest and inflation (True for 
Zimbabwe as it used to earn from  inflation and inflation tax) 
17 Cannot create inflation Can create inflation (in Zimbabwe the Central Bank has 
largely been viewed as the main agent fueling 
hyperinflation) 
18 Cannot finance spending 
by domestic government 
Can finance spending by domestic government (over the past 
few years, RBZ has saliently financed the domestic 
government) 
19 Requires no preconditions 
for monetary reform 
Requires preconditions for monetary reform (each monetary 
presentation has been coupled with monetary reform thus 
reactive to the existence of certain preconditions) 
20 Rapid monetary reform Slow monetary reform  
21 Small staff Large staff (Zimbabwe’s RBZ staff is not only large, but the 
bank has had a massive staff increase of 120 percent 
between 2001 to 2007, from 618 to 1 360 employees) 
Source: Hanke (2002, p. 90) and author compilation 
 
As alluded before, all countries to date which have implemented currency boards have 
witnessed positives changes in their economic performances following adoption of such 
monetary systems. A snapshot of some of the countries that instituted currency boards, as 
shown in Table 4 indicates that their economic variables changed for the good after 
implementation of such an arrangement. In all countries tabulated, their respective 
inflation trends declined from as high as four digits (or triple or double) to single digits. 
At the same time, their respective GDP growth rates shifted from negative rates to 
positive growth rates. Thus, these experiences are a true testimony that currency boards 
can help a country out of hyperinflationary trend and also from declining economic 
growth.  
 
Table 4: Before and after implementation of a currency board  
Year Argentina 
(1st April 1991) 
Estonia 
(20-24 June 1992) 
Lithuania 
(1st April 1994) 
Bulgaria 
(1st July 1997) 
 Inflation 
(%)  
GDP 
growth 
(%) 
Inflation 
(%)  
GDP 
growth 
(%) 
Inflation 
(%) 
GDP 
growth 
(%) 
Inflation 
(%) 
GDP 
growth 
(%) 
1989 4,923.6 -7.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a 69.6 -0.5 
1990 1,343.9 -1.3 23.1 n/a n/a n/a 64.3 -9.1 
1991 84.0a 10.5 210.5 n/a n/a n/a 4,027.8 -10.8 
1992 17.5 10.3 1 076 n/a 1 175 n/a 79.4 -8.4 
1993 12.6 6.3 89.0 n/a 188.4 -16.2 63.8 -11.6 
1994 3.9 5.8 47.7 -1.6 44.9 -9.8 121.9 -3.7 
1995 1.6 -2.8 29.0 5.0 35.7 1.2 32.9 -1.6 
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1996 0.1 5.5 23.1 5.0 14.9 5.1 310.8 -8.0 
1997 0.3 8.1 11.2 10.8 8.5 8.5 549.2 -5.8 
1998 0.7 3.9 8.2 5.4 3.1 7.5 1.6 4.1 
1999 -1.8 -3.4 3.3 -0.1 0.4 -1.5 7.0 2.3 
2000 -0.7 -0.8 4.0 9.6 1.6 4.1 11.3 5.4 
2001 -1.5 -4.4 5.8 7.7 2.1 6.6 4.8 4.1 
2002 41.0 -10.9 3.6 7.8 -0.9 6.9 3.8 4.5 
2003 3.7 8.8 1.3 7.1 -1.3 10.3 5.6 5.0 
2004 6.1 9.0 3.0 7.5 2.8 7.3 4.0 6.6 
2005 12.3 9.2 4.1 9.2 3.0 7.9 7.4 6.2 
2006 9.8 8.5 4.4 10.4 4.5 7.9 6.1 6.3 
2007 8.5 8.7 6.6 6.3 8.2 8.9 11.6 6.2 
2008 9.0 6.5 10.2 -1.5 9.2 3.9 9.6 6.3 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook database 
Note: “a” a bold figure marks the year in which a currency board was implemented 
 
 
3.3.1.2 Benefits and drawbacks of a currency board 
 
3.3.1.2.1 Advantages of a currency board 
 
 
i. Disciplined monetary policy rule 
 
The most important advantage of currency boards is that they replace a disciplined 
monetary policy rule (a gold standard without gold) for an undisciplined discretionary 
monetary policy, thus extinguishing the inflationary tendencies of the latter. To a country 
like Zimbabwe which is coming out of man-made hyperinflation environment, this 
possible advantage will be a great achievement for the country.  
 
 
ii. Fiscal discipline 
 
Another benefit of currency boards is that they ensure fiscal discipline since the currency 
board law prohibits any money printing to directly finance government expenditures. 
This benefit emanates from a combination of the fact that the monetary policy rule of the 
currency board restricts the scope for credit expansion, and also that the monetary 
authorities will be sensitive to external visibility and the fact that it will be costly to 
devalue in a fixed exchange rate regime. Due to the indiscipline characteristic of the RBZ 
through money-printing and lethargic policy implementation fiscal discipline has since 
been wanting. Thus, any system which tries to restore fiscal discipline is needed as a 
matter of urgency in the Zimbabwean economy.  
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iii. Possibility of stringer political will underpinned by amended law 
 
With a currency board system in place, there is a possibility of a stronger political will 
given that there will be a new central bank law or constitutional amendment which will 
be enacted to provide legal basis of the implementation of this new monetary system. 
This ‘law’ will make it harder for any political party to “undo” at will, thereby removing 
any possibility of speculative attacks on the local currency and also reducing the costs of 
borrowing. Given that in the case of Zimbabwe, there has been absence of political will 
to fight inflation over the past years, this advantage will apparently nail down policy 
makers in making overtures which will ensure the successful implementation of a 
currency board, which will in turn (prospectively) help the country in having price 
stability and a stable currency.   
 
 
3.3.1.2.2 Possible disadvantages of a currency board 
 
 
i. Difficult to correct overvalued exchange rate 
 
In the case where the real exchange rate fixed under the currency board system become 
substantially overvalued to the detriment of the country (for instance, resulting in the 
country’s exports becoming uncompetitive at the international market), it is very 
difficulty to correct this exchange rate. This stems from the fact that the exchange rate 
adjustment will be absorbed solemnly by domestic costs and prices, with no help from 
the nominal exchange rate. Nevertheless, this drawback is watered down by proponents 
of currency boards on the basis that practical experiences of countries which have 
instituted such monetary arrangements, for instance Hong Kong which adopted a 
currency board in 1983 have continued to be one of the most competitive economy in the 
world (Gwartney and Lawson, 2001). Thus this argument is therefore neither here nor 
there if Zimbabwe really wants to adopt this system. 
 
 
ii. Loss of ability to fine tune monetary policy to deal with shocks 
 
Another cited criticism of a currency board is that such a system inputs rigid rules to such 
an extent that the country will forfeiture its ability to fine-tune its monetary policy to 
respond to unanticipated and asymmetric external shocks Thus, according to this 
drawback, a country with a currency board in place will be more prone to external shocks 
than are countries with central banks. This criticism however contradicts practical 
experiences. For instance, the recent financial and banking crisis which started in the 
USA in mid 2008 have affected most countries, developed and developing alike, and 
most of the countries affected have central bank systems, and not currency boards. Also, 
Hanke (2002b) pointed out that the variability in growth rates between countries with 
currency boards, on one hand, and countries with central bank systems, on the other hand, 
was almost the same. This prompted Hanke (2002a) to conclude that whether a country 
has a currency board or a central bank, the most important thing to note is that the 
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country with a currency board is prone to external shocks, while a country with a central 
bank system is subject to internal shocks, with both shocks producing effects of similar 
magnitude. To this end, this disadvantage becomes just a mere criticism.  
 
 
iii. Constrained lender of last resort (LORR) 
 
The loss of lender of last resort (LORR) function by the central bank has been put 
forward as one of the disadvantages of a currency board monetary system, by both 
economists and some institutions. For instance, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) (2001:117) clearly states “a currency board regime makes 
payments crises less likely only by making bank crises more likely”. Although this 
sounds economically well thought, practical experiences however refute such thinking. 
For instance, the current financial and banking crises which started in mid 2008 in USA 
and currently bedeviling many major developed countries are all occurring in countries 
with central bank systems in which the lender of last resort functions are fully practiced. 
Zimbabwe is also a very good example to refute the line of thinking presented by 
UNCTAD above in that the country has had serious banking crises in 2004 under the 
central banking system. In sharp contrast to the possible loss of LORR criticism, practical 
experiences show that countries which have implemented currency boards (for instance, 
Bulgaria), have not only prevented banking crises, but rather their banking systems have 
tended to become firm over time, since the presence of currency board system provided a 
strong emphasis on the banking system that they would not be bailed out by the LORR. 
Hence, this criticism of loss of LORR cannot prevent a country like Zimbabwe to 
implement a currency board if the country seriously wants such a monetary arrangement.    
 
 
iv. Optimum currency area 
 
Some argue that if the country opting for currency board is not in optimum currency area 
with the anchor country, then implementing a currency board will be fruitless and a waste 
of resources and effort. Optimum currency area is considered as “… an artificial 
construct within which exchange rates should be fixed and between which exchange rates 
should be flexible” (Hanke, 2002: 101). Again practical experiences have proved this 
argument to be vain given that some countries which have adopted currency board 
system, for instance Argentina, have succeeded in achieving their currency board 
objectives (among others, lowering inflation and increasing GDP growth rates) by using 
the USA as the anchor country, though the former country was not in an optimum 
currency area with the latter anchor country. Thus, Zimbabwe can choose any country as 
the anchor, whether the country is in the same optimum currency area with Zimbabwe or 
not.  
 
v. Currency boards mainly desirable in small countries 
 
Some theorists argue that currency boards works perfectly in small tiny economies. Such 
argument is not supported by empirical evidence given that practical experiences indicate 
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that even large countries have successfully implemented currency boards. For instance, 
Argentina and Hong Kong which implemented this system are not tiny and to date ranked 
the 31st and 40th, respectively (out of 182 countries reported) in terms of GDP in 2008 
(IMF’s World Economic Outlook database). To the contrary, Zimbabwe has been drifting 
over the recent year from being a small country into a very small country as measured by 
it GDP figures. Thus, Zimbabwe is a supper candidate of a currency board.  
 
3.3.2 System 2: Free banking  
 
Free banking entails a monetary system in which commercial banks and market forces 
control the provision of banking services in a country. According to Smith (1936), unlike 
central banking system, under free banking system private banks have ability to raise 
sufficient capital, gunner public confidence and gain acceptance of their privately issued 
notes and ensure profitability of their undertaking, in the absence of special conditional 
authorization from a government authority. 
 
The principle replicates financial sector liberalization, as it is open to undertaking by 
would-be investors, and in the Zimbabwean scenario: locals, foreign nationals or even as 
an investment offer to the Zimbabwean Diaspora to which most credible bankers have 
sought favourable pastures. The basic requirement desired for forming their banks is that 
they meet requirements common to other business operations such as shareholders and 
profile disclosures, periodic publishing of financial statements and portfolios disclosures 
to their clientele to enhance their credit worthiness. They would then enjoy liberties 
ranging from; printing and issuance of bank notes, acceptance of deposits to current 
accounts, payment and collection of cheques for customers, borrow money on term-
deposits and other forms of secured and unsecured borrowing, lend money and further 
provide guarantees and documentary letters of credit. 
 
Thus, under free banking system banks would have the liberty to issue deposits and 
circulate notes in any currency they so consider as being favoured by economic agents. 
The most important assumption is that the system is liberal and provides liberty for banks 
and customers to discover what works best for their business and day-to-day transactions. 
Historical evidence nevertheless shows that in most instances, instead of having multiple 
currencies in circulation for a long time, there would be convergence of the issued notes 
into a single unit of account, typically gold or a foreign currency.  
 
 
3.3.2.1 Main features of Free Banking  
 
The following are some of the most important characteristics of a free banking system: 
 
i. Competition in issuing of notes: The central bank's note issuing monopoly will be 
replaced by competitive issuing of redeemable bearer currency. In light of 
technology and communication advancement in this globalized world, not only 
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will the issued notes be limited to issued in hard copies but can also extend to 
include any form of electronic tokens, too. 
 
ii. Uninsured banks: The government will not bail out or insure banks that cannot 
pay their depositors. Thus, under the system, any bank, which becomes insolvent, 
will be subjected to the country’s general laws of bankruptcy, with a possibility 
that depositors may loose their money upon liquidation.   
 
iii. Mutual acceptance:  Whilst under central banking, the law underpins any printed 
currency to be accepted as legal tender, in this system, there will be mutual 
acceptance by banks of each other's notes at par as well as indirect redemption of 
notes by banks through note exchange.  
 
 
iv. No legal tender: No currency will be a legally enforced currency under this 
system. Thus, any economic agent will be free to accept or deny trading in the 
currency they choose. Nevertheless, in the case where the central bank issues 
currency, that currency will only be mandatory for government-related 
transactions and payments such as taxes and fines. 
 
v. No enforced fractional reserve ratio. There will be no mandatory fractional 
reserves, but rather banks will be at liberty to float their reserve ratio, or in some 
instances selling their financial products with differing fractional reserves, and 
differing restrictions on withdrawals rules.  
 
vi. Development of short-term credit markets: The system is premised on the 
development of short-term credit markets to ensure automatic currency 
smoothing, whereby banks with excess reserves lend to banks in need of reserves 
on short-term basis at an agreed interest rate.  
 
vii. Automatic clearing houses: Although there will be competition among banks in 
provision of such services as current accounts, there will however be clearing of 
inter-bank payments between participating banks through clearing houses and 
settlement banks. 
 
viii. Investment opportunities: As a means of trying to harness the benefits of the 
system, there will be development of investment opportunities in such activities 
as marketable debt securities as well as provision of investment opportunities that 
can be liquidated at short notice.   
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3.3.2.2 Advantages of Free banking 
 
i. Competition in the banking sector 
 
Free banking not only involves competition among banks on the deposit side, but it also 
extends competition to issuing of notes. Hanke (2008) points out that use of multiple 
brands of currency notes have not resulted in any problems for free banking systems 
when compared to multiple brands of deposits which have resulted in some problems in 
central banking or other systems. 
 
 
ii. System is safer from money printing abusive dispositions 
 
Under free banking the banks produce their own currency, which would compete for the 
business of money users. Competition in currency would give producers the incentive to 
neither overproduce or under produce currency and therefore maintain its value. For 
banks to have their liabilities (currencies) accepted, they would have to make them 
redeemable in some commodity (e.g. gold) or some other asset. Clients would not accept 
more paper liabilities without some link or connection to an item, which has value 
outside of the banking system. 
  
3.3.2.3 Disadvantages of Free banking 
 
i. Possible loopholes 
 
In the Zimbabwean context, unless things change, free banking would obviously be 
suspect and flawed with loopholes prone to manipulation given the country’s experience 
with high profile white-collar crime or manipulative tendencies tailored for self-
aggrandizement by way of enormous profiteering. The existence of the liberty to issue 
deposits and circulate notes in any currency as favored by the participating economic 
agents will naturally create this scenario. 
 
 
ii. Potential for bank runs 
 
With a combination of no lender of last resort and Zimbabwe’s experience with bank 
runs, there will be a possibility that bank runs my also happen, in which case depositors 
may end up loosing their money. The situation will be even more severe for local banks 
with no any possible external sources to bail them out, unlike international banks that can 
get the ‘lender of last resort’ facility from the headquarters or branches from other 
countries. 
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iii. Possible confusion in the banking sector 
 
Whilst free banking may look sound on the blueprint, its application may lead to possible 
confusion in the banking sector, especially when involving issuing of multiple currencies 
by participating banks. Because of the complexity of banking business, by virtue of it 
involving money, lack of authority from government through central bank may end up 
creating more harm to the economy than good.  
 
 
iv. Free banking system irrelevant  
 
Although Zimbabwe once had an experience with free banking between 1892 –1940 
holding features of a “least restricted system” with only two commercial banks (Standard 
Bank of South Africa and Bank of Africa) issuing notes denominated in pounds kept 
equal to the pound sterling, one would be quick to remind such postulations of the time, 
era and country specifics compatibility of the system. The era reflects the pioneer era, 
with a colonial regime; holding a small banking population thus limited clientele. Thus 
any form of banking business would obviously be a function of good faith among elite. 
The population has grown, and the economy has been exposed to varying white-collar 
crimes and corruptive tendencies, which renders the system idealistic. 
 
As rightly noted by Schuler (2001) free banking remains a forgotten banking system, 
such that regardless of wide spread interest in it, it exists nowhere today as a living 
system. Experimenting with such a vulnerable economy would not be worth the risk. 
 
 
v. Government’s loss of Control over Monetary Policy 
 
The Central Bank is generally government instituted. The fact that the RBZ issues notes 
to the market provides it with an indirect control over the rest of the money supply 
function. Under free banking, for the fact that private banks will be issuing notes, it 
implies loss of authoritative control over money supply. 
 
3.3.3 System 3: Retaining the RBZ  
 
The local currency can be re-introduced under the supervision and management of the 
central bank, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ). However, given the clear proof of 
the inability of the RBZ since 2004 to manage money in such a way that the currency 
retains its main functions of medium of exchange, unit of account, store of value and 
standard of deferred payments, RBZ can only manage the re-introduced local dollar if 
there is a change of management and its functions are limited to that of ensuring price 
stability. Unless RBZ gains some credibility in the eyes of the economic agents, the re-
introduction of the country’s local currency may prove to be disastrous as it may arouse 
previous memories of hyperinflation and rapid loss of value of the currency.  
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Thus, the best way to build confidence in the currency would be to ensure that even the 
management at the country’s central bank is overhauled by bring in new team and 
experienced managers with track record of professional conduct in financial sector. In the 
initial stages, the contract duration of the new management can be for short periods of say 
two years, renewable upon meeting of mutual set monetary and performance targets. 
Such conditional office tenure will ensure that the management will conduct their duties 
in uttermost good faith and for the betterment of the country, and not manipulating the 
functions of RBZ to serve certain groups of people and political parties at the expense of 
national develop, as has been the case since 2004.  
 
Besides changing the management of RBZ, the country should also amend the Reserve 
Bank Act to limit the bank’s activities to those related to price stability, with fiscal 
activities left to relevant ministries. Restricting RBZ’s functions to only inflation fighting 
will mean that the bank will not be involved in money printing for the sake of financing 
fiscal activities as has been the case since 2004, and in that way, chances of reviving 
hyperinflationary  trends through money printing will be limited, if ever it will happen. 
The end result will be enhanced credibility of the RBZ, and eventually economic agents’ 
confidence in the local currency will be boosted.  
 
4. WHICH OPTION SHOULD THE COUNTRY ADOPT? 
 
The monetary systems presented and detailed in the preceding pages are all potential 
options that the country can consider adopting after the multi-currency regime comes to 
an end. Nevertheless, given country’s current situation, the study considers the options in 
the following descending order of priority (i) dollarization, (ii) retaining the Z$ but under 
the management system of a currency board, (iii) Joining the CMA, (iv) retaining the Z$ 
under the management of RBZ, with the institution having new management, and lastly 
(v) free banking.  
 
5 CONCLUSION 
 
The study presented main features of possible currency options which can be potentially 
adopted by Zimbabwe in the aftermath of multi-currency regime. The currency options 
analyzed are dollarization, joining the CMA and re-introduction of the Zimbabwe dollar 
(Z$). The proposed management systems to underpin the reintroduction of the 
Zimbabwean dollar are currency board, free banking and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
(RBZ). For each of the options analyzed, the practicality of Zimbabwe in adopting and/or 
implementing such currency was also explained. Although any of the three options could 
be adopted and implemented, the study considered the options in the following 
descending order of priority: (i) dollarization, (ii) retaining the Z$ but under the 
management system of a currency board, (iii) Joining the CMA, (iv) retaining the Z$ 
under the management of RBZ, with the institution having new management, and lastly 
(v) free banking.   
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